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Abstract
Policies to promote renewable electricity are
increasingly seen as a way to reduce the negative
environmental impacts associated with electricity
consumption and meet growing electricity demand.
This paper reviews the international experience
with one such policy, namely, renewable energy cer-
tificates, and considers important design aspects of
a national green certificate system. Within a South
African context, a green certificate system would
provide a mechanism with which to verify compli-
ance with any future renewable energy obligations,
and would encourage renewable electricity genera-
tion in the current monopoly environment. In terms
of a national green certificate framework, interna-
tional experience has shown that renewable energy
certificates must be both accredited and standard-
ized, with enforcement of penalties for non-compli-
ance with renewable energy quotas. Above all, a
long-term and stable policy environment is crucial
for developing renewable energy markets. 
Keywords: renewable energy; tradable renewable
energy certificates
1. Introduction: international and domestic
context
Strong action is needed to reduce global green-
house gas (GHG) emissions and reverse the trend
towards higher global temperatures (Stern Review,
2007). Given the threat to the climate from fossil
fuels, a focus on clean energy and energy efficiency
is growing (DEAT, 2008). Increasing the share of
renewable energy in terms of the national energy
mix is rising to the top of political agendas world-
wide.
The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
for a Framework Convention on Climate Change
drafted the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was opened
for signature in 1992. ‘The primary objective of the
UNFCCC is to achieve stabilisation of the concen-
trations of GHG in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system’ (UNFCCC, 1992). As
South Africa ratified the UNFCCC in 1997, the
country is entitled to apply for financial assistance
from the Global Environmental Facility for climate
change related activities.
The Kyoto Protocol,1 a legal instrument under
the framework of the Convention, sets binding tar-
gets under which industrialised (Annex I) countries
must reduce greenhouse gas emissions by an aver-
age of five percent against 1990 levels over the peri-
od 2008-2012 (UNFCCC, 1997). The Kyoto
Protocol is the first and only binding international
agreement to set targets for the reduction of green-
house gas emissions (Fakir and Nicol, 2008). 
In March 2002, South Africa acceded to the
Protocol. While the Protocol does not commit non-
Annex I (developing) economies such as South
Africa to quantified emission reduction targets over
the period 2008-2012, there is potential for emis-
sion reduction through the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) which promotes emission
reductions between non-Annex I countries and
Annex I countries. The CDM facilitates Annex I
investment in emission-reducing projects in non-
Annex I economies. In this way, Annex I countries
are able to obtain carbon credits to enable them to
meet their emissions reduction targets. As such, the
CDM supports sustainable development with
respect to GHG emissions in developing countries
while helping Annex I countries to comply with their
Kyoto Protocol commitments and reducing the
overall level of GHG emissions (DME, 2003; Fakir
and Nicol, 2008). 
South Africa is very dependent on fossil fuels as
a primary energy source. Specifically, around 90
percent of energy is derived from low cost coal
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(DEAT, 2008). Furthermore, 93 percent of electrici-
ty generation is based on coal (Winkler, 2005).
South Africa is ranked 19th in terms of world emis-
sions (based on absolute totals for six GHGs2 in
2000) contributing 1.1 percent of the global emis-
sions total, and is ranked 13th in terms of the carbon
intensity of electricity production (CAIT, 2009). In
the 2003 White Paper on Renewable Energy, while
recognizing South Africa’s dependence on fossil
fuels to meet energy requirements, the state
acknowledged the growing need for South Africa to
become a responsible ‘global neighbour’, amid
mounting concerns about global climate change
(DME, 2003).
In this context, the 2003 White Paper on
Renewable Energy sets out government’s vision for
promoting renewable energy in South Africa: 
Government’s long-term goal is the establish-
ment of a renewable energy industry producing
modern energy carriers that will offer in future
years a sustainable, fully non-subsidised alterna-
tive to fossil fuels. The proportion of final ener-
gy consumption currently provided by renew-
able energy has come about largely as a result of
poverty (e.g. fuelwood and animal waste used
for cooking and heating). To get started on a
deliberate path towards this goal, the
Government’s medium-term (10-year) target is:
10 000 GWh renewable energy contribution to
final energy consumption by 2013, to be pro-
duced mainly from biomass, wind, solar and
small-scale hydro… This is approximately 4%
(1667 MW) of the projected electricity demand
for 2013 (41539 MW). (DME, 2003: ix)
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly
outlines the policy instruments available for the pro-
motion of renewable energy sources, while section
3 discusses green certificate trading in more detail,
including the green certificate market in South
Africa at present. Section 4 describes the interna-
tional implementation of renewable energy support
mechanisms. The lessons learnt from this experi-
ence in terms of design suggestions for the devel-
opment of a South African TREC framework are
detailed in Section 5. Also from international expe-
rience, Section 6 provides a comparison of a feed-
in tariff scheme and a quota obligation system com-
bined with tradable green certificates. Finally, the
interaction between emission trading schemes and
renewable energy promotion systems are outlined
in Section 7. 
2. Policy instruments for the promotion of
renewable energy
While energy is critical to all aspects of South
Africa’s economic and social development, the way
in which it is produced and used can contribute to
environmental degradation, such as air pollution
and climate change. The ‘polluter pays’ principle
states that the party responsible for such pollution
must pay for the negative environmental impacts
caused. There is an internalisation of external costs
if the polluter pays adequately for any environmen-
tal damage caused. When external costs, such as air
pollution, are not internalised, the market mecha-
nism fails to secure an optimal allocation of
resources. This is because the prices of goods with
large external costs are understated when these
external costs are not internalised. As such, these
goods are over-consumed relative to the optimal
level of consumption for the wellbeing of society.
The internalisation of external costs is therefore a
necessary pre-condition for the optimal allocation
of resources. When these externalities are inter-
nalised, energy production technologies will be allo-
cated by the market according to their social costs,
and the price of goods (electricity) will reflect their
true cost (Ragwitz et al., 2006).
The European Commission has evaluated the
external costs of different energy systems. The
Commission’s ExternE project on external costs
estimated that the cost of producing electricity from
coal or oil in the European Union would double
and the cost of producing electricity from gas would
increase by 30 percent if external costs, in the form
of damage to environment and health, were taken
into account (Ragwitz et al., 2006).
Renewable energy sources decrease pollution,
contribute to the achievement of the Kyoto Protocol
climate change mitigation goals, allow countries to
improve security of energy supply by reducing fos-
sil fuel dependency and provide numerous socioe-
conomic opportunities such as investment, devel-
opment and job creation. Yet, despite these many
benefits, renewable energy competes with conven-
tional electricity on an unequal playing field amid a
failure to internalize the negative externalities asso-
ciated with conventional energy production. Public
support is thus needed to level the playing field and
promote the market penetration of renewable ener-
gy sources (Gonzalez, 2007).
In many countries, particularly in Europe, the
main policy instrument used to support renewable
electricity3 deployment is the feed-in tariff. In this
system, a premium price is paid for all qualifying
renewable electricity delivered to the grid. Utilities
are obliged to purchase this electricity at the set
price – which is determined by the state. Given that
the costs of generation differ across the spectrum of
renewable energy technologies, the feed-in tariff
usually differs by technology and is provided for a
specified time period. The feed-in tariff may also
decrease over time in line with reductions in the
cost of renewable energy generation. Theoretically,
by setting the price but not the quantity of electrici-
ty produced, it is not known in advance how much
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renewable energy will be generated amid the
scheme. However, the stability of a set price – given
that the tariff is high enough – can result in sus-
tained growth in renewable energy generation.
Conversely, the main criticism of the scheme is that
too high a price may result in excessive producer
surplus at the expense of electricity consumers
(Linden et al., 2005).
Feed-in tariffs are used in many EU-25 member
states, as will be discussed later. This system has
had success in the deployment of wind, biomass
and solar energy in Germany, Denmark and Spain.
It is noted that the main advantage of the system as
evidenced in these countries is certainty around the
duration of financial support – which ultimately
reduces the risk of investment (Ragwitz et al., 2006).
The use of quota obligation schemes has gained
in popularity in recent years. In a quota obligation
system – also referred to as a renewable obligation,
renewable portfolio standard (RPS) or renewable
energy target – a minimum share of renewable elec-
tricity is imposed on producers, suppliers or con-
sumers. The implementation of an obligation sys-
tem typically involves a penalty for non-compliance
to ensure that obligated parties meet their renew-
able energy purchase obligations. The obligation
scheme is often (but not necessarily) combined with
tradable green certificates to simplify the burden of
verifying compliance with the obligation and to
enable flexibility in achieving compliance. Quota
obligations combined with green certificates are
used in Belgium, Italy, Sweden, UK and Poland,
while 25 states in the United States, and
Washington DC, have mandatory RPS obligations –
with most RPS programmes incorporating the use
of tradable renewable energy certificates (TRECs)
(Linden et al., 2005; Ragwitz et al., 2006).4
A third category of renewable energy promotion
systems is the tender scheme. In such a system,
renewable energy developers compete for access to
power purchase agreements (and/or government
administered funds) through a competitive, govern-
ment administered bidding process. The tenders
can be differentiated according to different renew-
able energy technologies. Contracts are awarded to
the most competitive bids within each technology
band. Electricity utilities are often obliged to buy the
electricity at the winning-bid-price. Tendering
schemes of this kind have been used in, amongst
others, the UK, Ireland, France, the US and China
(Linden et al., 2005).
Although bidding processes are cost efficient,
given that they stimulate competition among
renewable energy generators, they have been less
successful in promoting renewable energy relative
to feed-in tariffs. This is likely due to uncertainty in
the market arising from the intermittency of the ten-
ders or the complexities of the bidding procedures
themselves. Furthermore, it is argued that the bid-
ding procedure leads to unrealistically low bids –
resulting in funds being committed to projects which
do not come to fruition. (Linden et al., 2005)
Additional measures can be used in conjunction
with the main instruments mentioned above to
ensure that the objectives for specific renewable
energy technologies are met: financial subsidies for
renewable energy technologies as specific $/kW
grants or grants specified as a percentage of total
investment; tax incentives such as tax refunds for
renewable electricity, energy tax exemption for
renewable electricity, reduced VAT rates for renew-
able electricity and the exemption of renewable
energy-related investments from income or corpo-
rate taxes. Green marketing systems in which a pre-
mium on electricity voluntarily purchased by con-
sumers is transferred to renewable energy genera-
tors to cover the additional generation costs associ-
ated with renewable energy (Linden et al., 2005).5
As evident from Table 1, policy instruments can
be classified in terms of whether they are price- or
quantity-based instruments. 
Table 1: Classification of policy measures
Source: Held and Ragwitz (2006)
Priced-based Quantity-based
mechanisms mechanisms
Feed-in tariff Quota combined with TGC
Fiscal incentives Tender schemes
Investment grants
3. Green certificate trading
TRECs – also known as renewable energy certifi-
cates (RECs), green certificates or green tags, repre-
sent the renewable value or ‘greenness’ of electrici-
ty produced from renewable sources, and are used
to simplify the burden of verifying compliance with
renewable energy targets and provide flexibility in
meeting the target (Linden et al., 2005). TRECS
can be banked, traded or consumed (redeemed),
and can be sold bundled with the underlying phys-
ical electricity or separately to it (Linden et al.,
2005). According to Morthorst (2001), the idea
behind this policy scheme is to use market forces to
determine the additional payment to investors in
renewable energy technologies. Therefore, the pay-
ments to renewable generators consist of two parts:
first, the sale of electricity to an energy utility such
as Eskom by power purchase agreement and, sec-
ondly, the sale of green certificates. The generated
electricity and the certificates are traded on separate
markets – the financial certificate market and the
physical electricity market. Obligated market actors
are able to purchase green certificates from the
financial certificate market to meet renewable ener-
gy obligations (GreenX Energy, 2008; Morthorst,
2001). By providing a revenue stream for develop-
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ers, green certificate trading theoretically stimulates
investment in renewable energy projects and facili-
tates the expansion of the renewable energy gener-
ation industry (Mitchell and Anderson, 2000).
Under a renewable energy obligation system,
demand for renewable electricity from obligated
market participants fuels demand for TRECs. In
practice, TRECs could be purchased by obligated
market participants directly from registered produc-
ers or from brokers and other intermediaries. In
order to verify compliance with the obligation, obli-
gated market participants must hand over the req-
uisite number of certificates to the monitoring
authority (typically on an annual basis). In this con-
text, green certificates act as an accounting instru-
ment which verifies whether the obligation has been
met (Linden et al., 2005). 
The price of a TREC is a function of both the
specified renewable energy target (Q) and the
marginal cost of generating renewable energy
sources (MCRE) is given in Figure 1. As is evident
from the figure, TRECs are priced at the differential
between the electricity tariff (Pe) and the marginal
cost of renewable energy generation (at the quota
level) (González, 2007). Without a TREC system,
given the electricity tariff, Pe, renewable electricity
would be produced up to A. In practice, adminis-
tration and marketing costs are included in the final
TREC price. (GreenX Energy, 2008).Generators
with lower marginal cost curves will be able to sell
their TRECs at a lower price (Mitchell and
Anderson, 2000). Delimatsis (2007) notes that
TREC prices will depend on the type of renewable
technology and the interaction of demand and sup-
ply (for example, coupling inelastic demand with
unstable electricity production due to weather con-
ditions). 
Figure 1: TREC-based quota system
Source: González, 2007; Haas et al., 2004;
Mitchell & Anderson, 2000
TREC systems can be either voluntary or
mandatory. In a voluntary policy environment,
green certificates are used to track and verify green
energy supply. The procurement of green energy in
this manner can be used in the reporting of envi-
ronmental performance. Conversely, in mandatory
markets, where producers or consumers are obli-
gated to produce or consume specified quantities of
renewable energy, TRECs provide a mechanism for
the verification and monitoring of compliance with
such obligations. Importantly, as TRECs can be
used in both a voluntary or mandatory policy envi-
ronment, the system provides a useful bridging
mechanism between the two (DME, 2007).
3.1 Life cycle of a TREC
The life cycle of a TREC consists of four stages,
specifically: registration of the generating device,
issuing, trading and redemption of the certificate.
These four stages are briefly discussed below.
Accreditation/registration: Renewable energy
generators apply for accreditation. Once verified,
the plant becomes an accredited TREC generator
and is registered in the TREC system register as
such (DME, 2007).
Issuing and verification of TREC: After the green
energy is produced and verified by the Issuing
Body, the generator receives certificates for a spec-
ified quantity of renewable energy. Each certificate
is uniquely identifiable, certifies the quantity and
type of green electricity produced and contains
standard information such as a unique certificate
number, generation plant identity, time of issue,
type of technology and date of expiry (GreenX
Energy, 2008). The TRECs are created as electron-
ic records in the TREC register and are credited to
the register account of the generator (Mitchell and
Anderson, 2000).
Trading and transferring of TRECs: The where-
abouts of the electronic certificate is registered,
tracked and monitored from the point of issue,
through trades and exchanges to redemption
(Mitchell and Anderson, 2000). This ongoing regis-
tration of the certificate will guard against double
counting. Trading can occur until such time as the
TREC is redeemed, exported, or expired (DME,
2007).
Withdrawal from circulation: A TREC is said to
have been redeemed once it has been consumed in
fulfilment of a renewable energy obligation. At this
stage, the TREC is withdrawn from circulation
(Mitchell and Anderson, 2000).
3.2 Elements of a TREC system
The essential elements of a TREC system can be
broadly categorized as, firstly, a system of gover-
nance, secondly, the rules by which certificates are
traded and, thirdly, the overall institutional context
within which the system is developed (DME, 2007).
These three elements are briefly discussed. For a
more detailed exposition, the reader is referred to
the DME (2007).
The system of governance refers to mandatory
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versus voluntary policy contexts. In a mandatory
policy environment, the legislated TREC system
provides verification and monitoring of compliance
with government legislated obligations. Conversely,
voluntary TREC systems are established – with or
without government involvement – by market par-
ticipants (DME, 2007).
A TREC system requires clearly defined system
rules of operation. The Renewable Energy Certi-
ficate System (RECS) is currently the only interna-
tional TREC issuing and trading system. RECS is an
umbrella organisation which governs an association
of independent Issuing Bodies called the Assoc-
iation of Issuing Bodies (AIB). The Principles and
Rules of Operation (PRO), previously known as the
Basic Commitment, was developed by the AIB and
sets out the common international standards that all
AIB members must subscribe to (AIB, 2008). The
PRO ‘is one of the cornerstones of TRECs in the
world and could be defined as the basis of TRECs
in Europe, it is linked to all TRECs worldwide and
has now also been adopted by the USA to form the
basis of their TRECs verification, monitoring, track-
ing and control system’ (DME, 2007). The PRO
prescribes a minimum set of criteria for the creation,
issue, transfer and redemption of certificates to
which all RECS Issuing Bodies must subscribe
(DME, 2007).
Two groups of institutions are relevant when
considering the institutional set-up of a TREC sys-
tem, namely, assorted market participants and the
TREC Issuing Body: TREC market participants
include renewable energy generators (TREC pro-
ducers), TREC traders and TREC consumers. The
Issuing Body, as discussed, is the organisation
responsible for the implementation of the rules and
procedures of the TREC system. The Issuing Body
is responsible for accreditation of renewable energy
generators via a physical device audit; registration
of accredited renewable energy generators; issuing
of TRECs in market participant accounts in a cen-
tral database; operating the TREC register and
administering market participant accounts; transfer-
ring TRECs; facilitating the international transfer of
TRECs where compatible; redeeming certificates;
and ongoing monitoring, development and evalua-
tion of the TREC system (DME, 2007).
The institutional setup of the Issuing Body must
be sufficiently entrenched so as to allow for legal
recourse in the event that dispute resolution is
required and/or in oversight of its operational activ-
ities. For the TREC system to be both credible and
reliable, it is important that the Issuing Body acts
independently from the market participants and
must not have a vested interest in the TREC market
(DME, 2007).
3.3 Green certificate trading in South Africa
The TREC market in South Africa at present is vol-
untary and in its infancy. The South African
National Tradable Renewable Energy Certificate
Team (SANTRECT) was formed by the Department
of Minerals and Energy in March 2008 (DME,
2008). SANTRECT is charged with the responsibil-
ity of facilitating and coordinating the establishment
of the South African TREC Issuing Body (SATIB).
SATIB, which is in the process of formation, will be
the governance authority for the renewable indus-
try, and will be responsible for registering, issuing,
transferring and redeeming green certificates.
SATIB will be based on the European AIB (GreenX
Energy, 2008).
SANTRECT is intending on registering the
Issuing Body by March 2009 (DME, 2008).
Currently, the registration of renewable energy pro-
duction devices is undertaken by Nano Energy –
which has been operating as the Interim TREC
Issuing Body since 2005 as part of the physical
green power voluntary market pilot project and the
emerging renewable energy certificate voluntary
trading initiative. Agreements have been put in
place for the operation of an interim central regis-
tration database by Amatola Green Power and
GreenX Energy. Renewable energy device audits
and registrations have been taking place since May
2005 – with six devices registered at September
2007 (Nano Energy, 2007).
3.4 Motivation for a national TREC system
TRECs can be used to track and verify green ener-
gy supply. Importantly, as TRECs can be used in
both a voluntary or mandatory policy environment,
the national TREC system will bridge the transition
to a possible future mandatory TREC system and
provide a mechanism with which to monitor com-
pliance with future renewable energy obligations
(DME, 2007).
The purchase of green attributes separate from
the underlying physical electricity avoids the com-
plexities and barriers that are associated with the
physical trade of power in a monopoly environ-
ment. As such, a TREC system will allow for the
proliferation of the renewable energy industry while
these regulatory issues are resolved and developed
(DME, 2007). Importantly, the verification of green
power provides a credible platform from which indi-
viduals and organisations can demonstrate a com-
mitment to environmentally sustainable purchases
and consumption. A TREC system will enable mar-
ket participants to transform this commitment into
tangible initiatives and projects via auditable finan-
cial transactions (GreenX Energy). As this green cer-
tificate market grows, there is increasingly a need
for coordination among parties issuing, trading and
selling certificates so as to uphold the integrity of the
TREC market, build consumer confidence and pre-
vent double counting and fraudulent claims (DME,
2007)..
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4. International implementation of renewable
energy support mechanisms
The section provides an overview of the policy
instruments used in Europe, the United States and
Australia. Experiences from the international imple-
mentation of these policy instruments will inform
our own recommendations for the development of
a national TREC system. 
4.1 Europe
4.1.1 EU-15 member states 
Table 2 provides an overview of the main policies
instruments used to support renewable electricity in
EU-15 member states. Figure  2indicates the evolu-
tion of the main support instruments in the EU-15
for the period 1997–2005. As evident from the fig-
ure, only eight countries did not have a major poli-
cy shift in this period (Haas et al., 2007a). Quota
regulation in conjunction with tradable green certifi-
cates has recently replaced existing policy instru-
ments in Belgium, Italy, Sweden and the UK.
Tender schemes are not used as the dominating
policy instrument in any EU-25 member state. It is
evident that investment incentives are used by var-
ious countries as supplementary instruments. 
4.1.2 The Renewable Energy Certificate System
RECS is an international, voluntary TREC issuing
and trading system operating in Europe with over
200 members in over 24 European countries
(RECS, 2008). The system was created to stimulate
global renewable energy development, advocate
the usage of a standard certificate as evidence of
the production of renewable energy, and provide a
methodology which facilitates renewable energy
trade (RECS, 2008). As has been previously men-
tioned, RECS is an umbrella organisation which
governs the AIB – an organisation of individual
TREC issuers (DME, 2007). The reader is referred
to Section 3 for a brief discussion of the PRO: a
framework developed by the AIB which sets out the
mandatory standards to which all AIB members
must subscribe.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the main renewable energy policy support scheme in EU-15 member states
Source: Haas, Held, Resch, Ragwitz, Faber & Huber (2007a)
Table 2: Overview of the main policies for
renewable electricity in EU-15 member states
Source: Ragwitz et al. (2006)
Country Main electricity support scheme
Austria Feed-in tariffs combined with regional 
investment incentives
Belgium Quota obligation system combined with 
TGC and minimum prices for renewable 
electricity
Denmark Feed-in tariffs
Finland Energy tax exemption combined with 
investment incentives
France Feed-in tariffs
Germany Feed-in tariffs
Greece Feed-in tariffs combined with investment 
incentives
Ireland Tendering scheme (to be replace by a 
feed-in tariff scheme)
Italy Quota obligation system combined with 
TGC 
Luxembourg Feed-in tariffs
Netherlands Feed-in tariffs
Portugal Feed-in tariffs combined with investment 
incentives
Spain Feed-in tariffs
Sweden Quota obligation system combined with 
TGC 
UK Quota obligation system combined with 
TGC 
4.2 United States
The Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) system
aims to maintain or increase renewable energy con-
tribution to electricity supply.6 RPS typically impos-
es a percentage renewable energy obligation on
retail electricity suppliers. Most RPS policies are leg-
islated. Renewable energy purchase obligations
vary significantly among states from 2% – 30% of
retail sales. Currently, 25 states and Washington DC
(Wiser and Barbose, 2008) have mandatory RPS
obligations, while four additional states have volun-
tary renewable energy standards. The amount of
nationwide load covered by existing mandatory
RPS programmes (including those not fully imple-
mented as yet) is roughly 46% (Wiser and Barbose,
2008). Most RPS programmes incorporate the use
of tradable renewable energy certificates (RECs) to
increase flexibility, reduce compliance costs and
facilitate compliance tracking. It is recognized that
the application of RECs has contributed significant-
ly towards the achievement of RPS targets, with the
overall level of RPS compliance in 2006 estimated
at around 94% (Wiser and Barbose, 2008; Wiser et
al., 2007).
4.3 Australia
The Australian Government introduced a Man-
datory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) scheme in
2001 as part of a broader government response to
climate change. The MRET scheme aims to
increase the generation of electricity from renew-
able sources and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act of 2000
mandates the generation of an additional 9500
GWh of renewable energy per year by 2010–2020.
MRET operates by imposing a binding obligation to
support renewable electricity generation on large
wholesaler purchasers of electricity, for example, an
electricity retailer buying wholesale electricity to
meet retail sale obligations. The MRET is backed by
a TREC system. If a liable party does not discharge
their liability by surrendering TRECs, a Renewable
Energy Shortfall Charge (penalty) of $40 per TREC
applies (Australian Government, 2008; Linden et
al., 2005).
In 2007, under the national renewable energy
target (RET) scheme, the Australian Government
committed to ensuring that at least 20 per cent of
Australia’s electricity supply (approximately 60 000
GWh) comes from renewable energy sources by
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Figure 3: Existing state RPS policies and non-binding renewable energy goals
Source: Renewables Portfolio Standards in the United States (April 2008)
2020. Accordingly, the MRET will likely increase to
45 000 GWh to ensure that – together with the
approximately 15 000 GWh of existing renewable
capacity – Australia reaches the 20 per cent target
by 2020. Ultimately the national MRET and existing
state-based targets will be brought into a single
national scheme (COAG Working Group on
Climate Change and Water, 2008). 
The Australian Department of Minerals and
Energy (2007: 45) notes that by establishing MRET
as a mandatory scheme:
backed up by legislation and regulation – includ-
ing monitoring using a TREC-based system and
penalties for non-compliance – an effective and
transparent implementation has been achieved.
... The experience with the scheme confirms …
that by ensuring a solid ‘paper trail’ available
through an internet based publicly accessible
registry, monitoring and evaluation is significant-
ly facilitated, and data quality and accuracy
greatly strengthened. 
5. Basic design issues and concepts:
lessons from the international experience;
framework for a national TGC scheme 
In this section we indicate the basic design require-
ments for a TREC system and discuss some addi-
tional design elements that have emerged from the
international experience. 
Renewable electricity should be accredited to
foster consumer confidence in green electricity, par-
ticularly in the case of voluntary TREC systems. In
addition, the principle that there is equivalence
between TRECs (standardisation), regardless of
their means of production, is fundamental to the
entire trading system. The accreditation and stan-
dardization body does not have to be linked to the
government (as in the case of RECS). In addition,
the national system should be in accordance with
any international system so that international trade
in certificates is a possibility. The benefits of inter-
national trade in TRECs include: greater access to
renewable electricity; efficiency gains amid access
to renewable technologies that are less expensive in
other countries; if a TREC is associated with some
measure of carbon abated, then buyers of TRECs
can receive a carbon credit (the reader is referred to
Morthorst (2000) for more on this (Mitchell and
Anderson, 2000).
The time aspects of TREC systems are important
given that they can have a significant impact on the
purchasing behaviour of market participants and
thus on the price of green certificates. For example,
a fixed annual obligation date might induce a rush
to meet obligation targets as the deadline
approached. This rush could result in inflated prices
and increased market volatility. In a bid to build
confidence in renewable energy markets and
encourage a steady rate of renewable energy
deployment, the design of the TREC system must
aim to reduce the likelihood of TREC price hikes.
Price hikes and associated market volatility are
more likely to occur the longer the time horizon
between redemption dates and the shorter the
redemption period. While more frequent redemp-
tion dates are likely to have a smoothing effect in
this regard, this benefit must be considered against
the possibility of higher transaction costs (Mitchell
and Anderson, 2000).
In a bid to reduce the likelihood of price hikes,
the following design options can be considered
(Mitchell and Anderson, 2000):
• Banking: Where market participants can store
surplus certificates (produced or procured) in
the current redemption period for use in future
redemption periods; 
• Borrowing: Where actors with a shortfall of
TRECs are able to reduce their target in the cur-
rent redemption period by adding to their target
in future redemption periods. Obligatees are
thus able to defer purchases in the current com-
pliance period, conditional on making up the
shortfall in the subsequent compliance period
(Schwartz, 2006). Together, banking and bor-
rowing provide the opportunity for obligatees to
purchase TRECs when prices are low (Schwartz,
2006);
• Rolling redemption periods: Where market par-
ticipants are able to meet their target over a pro-
longed period. If participants can meet their tar-
get over a five year period, their total TRECs tar-
get would be five times the size of an annual tar-
get, but they will be accorded flexibility in how
they meet it. For example, years with low wind
levels can be offset by years with higher wind
levels. Such a system would require rolling
deadlines and annual intermediate targets to
prevent a large price hike at the end of the five
year period; and
• TREC expiry dates: TRECs can be designed
with an expiry date to ensure that they are used
within a certain time period after their produc-
tion. A short TREC lifetime encourages rapid
deployment while an infinite TREC lifetime can
be used to reassure the market.
In this context, Vogstad (2005) notes that TREC
prices will be volatile and subject to weather fluctu-
ations if flexible mechanisms such as borrowing and
banking are not implemented.
The enforcement of penalties in the case of non-
compliance must be guaranteed for the system to
operate optimally; in addition, in order to incen-
tivise market actors to fulfil their quota obligation,
the penalty for non-compliance should be signifi-
cantly higher than the expected market price for
green certificates (Ragwitz et al., 2006). In the case
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of a TREC with no price cap, the penalty can be
constructed as a flexible cost such as TREC + X,
where X is the penalty over and above the TREC
market price. The penalty, also known as the buy
out price, can be diverted to obligatees who have
met their obligation (reducing their costs and
encouraging compliance) (Anderson and Mitchell,
2000).
Based on extensive stakeholder consultation,
Ragwitz et al., (2006: 20) conclude that a long-term
and stable policy environment – irrespective of the
instrument utilised – is the single most important
issue for success in developing renewable electricity
markets: 
Whether it concerns a feed-in tariff based sup-
port system, quota obligation scheme or tax
incentive, in order to be able to attract investors
and project developers, in order to allow suffi-
cient time for project planning, realisation and
all necessary steps of the authorisation proce-
dure a framework with long term stability is
highly desirable.
A long-term framework is a necessary condition
for the cost-effective promotion of renewable elec-
tricity generation. As such, long term renewable
energy targets – such as setting renewable electrici-
ty targets for the year 2020 – can be important in
creating a stable investment environment (Ragwitz
et al., 2006),
The application of technology specific support
can reduce transfer costs for society by increasing
renewable energy deployment as less mature tech-
nologies receive a stimulus now – becoming avail-
able to a larger extent in the future. A feed-in tariff
is able to do this more easily than a uniform TREC
system with no additional support. With respect to
a feed-in tariff scheme, differentiation between
renewable technologies can be easily implemented
as the price level per technology can be set directly.
As such, when considering the TREC framework,
alternatives are available for the provision of tech-
nology specific support: combine a quota obliga-
tion/TREC system with other policy instruments
such as investment grants or tax incentives;7 value
a MWh of renewable electricity from different tech-
nologies differently where a MWh generated from a
less mature or less cost efficient technology are
translated into a green certificate with a value high-
er than one MWh (Ragwitz et al., 2006).
The risk assessment of investors with respect to
a specific policy instrument affects the transfer costs
for consumers, given that it is consumers who ulti-
mately pay for the associated investor risk. The risk
assessment of potential investors is influenced by
the stability and type of the support scheme.
Specifically, risk is positively correlated with investor
uncertainty in terms of the sale of renewable elec-
tricity. Risk is lower in the context of a feed-in tariff
scheme where both the magnitude and duration of
support is known. Conversely, a high-risk premium
exists under a TREC scenario as the income from
the sale of TRECS is uncertain. Risks can be
decreased, however, by the implementation of a
guaranteed price floor for TRECs or the allowance
of banking and borrowing of green certificates
(Ragwitz et al., 2006). 
Haas et al. (2007) show that the level of support
– expressed in terms of green certificate prices – in
Belgium, Italy, and the UK is significantly higher
than renewable energy generation costs. The rea-
son for the higher support level, while partly due to
immature TGC markets, is due to ‘the non-technol-
ogy-specific application of the currently applied
TGC-systems as well as in [sic] a higher risk premi-
um requested by investors’ (Hass et al. 2007:
2835)’. This indicates the importance of taking cog-
nisance of the factors discussed above when deter-
mining the framework of a national TREC scheme. 
A single policy instrument is typically not suffi-
cient to develop the full gambit of renewable ener-
gy sources available in a particular country. The
majority of renewable investments are the product
of a combination of renewable energy support mea-
sures as opposed to one single policy instrument. In
addition to feed-in tariffs and quota obligations
combined with TGCs, which are the principle sup-
port schemes in Europe, various fiscal incentives,
target setting, a long term framework and a stable
policy environment have culminated in a stable
investment climate for selected technologies in
European markets (Ragwitz et al., 2006).
The DME (2007) feasibility report recommend-
ed the adoption of the Principles and Rules of
Operation of the Association of Issuing Bodies: 
to provide a simple, clear, practical, and able to
be readily implemented, administratively effi-
cient method of operation and rules for South
Africa… These rules provide a clear definition of
eligible TREC renewable energy resources and
technologies and the handling of each of these.
As a tried and tested system, the PRO is man-
ageable yet robust, reducing the likelihood of
error or fraud. It is complementary to and com-
patible with existing policy, the legal and regula-
tory framework, and sustainable with minimum
external financial requirements beyond the ini-
tial start-up years prior to sufficient market vol-
ume. Furthermore, as the basis for many other
international TREC systems, it is compatible
with and provides potential for co-operation
with other prominent TREC systems. It specifies
the rights and duties of market players and the
tasks that need to be assigned to various bodies.
The rules include verification requirements and
procedures for the resolution of disputes. The
50 Journal of Energy in Southern Africa  •  Vol 22 No 1  •  February 2011
PRO presents a clear definition of the content of
the certificate and ensures that the benefits of
renewable energy production are not double
counted or sold several times. (DME, 2007: 13) 
6. Comparison of feed-in tariff and quota
obligation combined with TGCs: lessons
from international experience
The following findings are drawn from a detailed
analysis by Ragwitz et al., (2006) of support
schemes in EU-25 and EU-10 member states. The
reader is referred to the source for more informa-
tion. 
6.1 Feed-in tariffs
• Feed-in tariffs have proved successful in trigger-
ing significant dissemination in renewable elec-
tricity technologies in all countries in which they
have been implemented.
• A feed-in tariff is effective, flexible and fast in
terms of renewable electricity deployment, it is
easy to install and has minimal administration
costs.
• The instrument easily facilitates the provision of
technology specific support which helps to
reduce transfer costs for consumers.
• A feed-in tariff does not promote competition
between investors. As such, it does not lead to
reductions in electricity costs. This can be cir-
cumvented to some extent by guaranteeing a
long tariff duration, which will result in efficiency
gains.
• Feed-in tariffs are economically efficient if the
tariff rates decline over time in line with the
expected learning rate or a stepped feed-in tariff
is applied.
• As feed-in tariffs are effective at relatively low
producer profits, they provide deployment of
renewable electricity at lowest costs for con-
sumers (Haas et al., 2007; Ragwitz et al., 2006).
6.2 Quota obligations based on tradable
green certificates
• The instrument encourages competition among
renewable electricity generators given that the
market is sufficiently large;
• A quota obligation scheme in conjunction with
tradable certificates results in minimal total
renewable electricity costs but not minimal costs
for consumers. This is because a higher risk pre-
mium is associated with a TGC scheme and a
TGC system cannot reduce producer surplus.
The implication is that such that a TGC scheme
is cost efficient in terms of installed renewable
electricity capacity but not in terms of costs
borne by the consumer;
• In contrast to a feed-in tariff scheme, a signifi-
cant advantage of this system is that the target
will be exactly reached – with the provision of
enough incentives such as penalties for non
compliance (Ragwitz et al., 2006).
7. Interaction between emissions trading and
renewable energy promotion
There is a significant distinction between schemes
allowing for the trading of emission rights such as
the Kyoto Protocol and schemes that develop a
framework for the trade of renewable energy (or
‘green’) certificates. In emission trading schemes
(ETSs), the tradable item is an entitlement to
release a certain quantity of greenhouse gas emis-
sions into the atmosphere. Conversely, with regard
to a scheme that allows for or mandates trade in
‘green’ certificates, governments impose an obliga-
tion that a minimum share of the electricity gener-
ated or supplied to the retail consumer is derived
from renewable energy sources (Jensen and Skytte,
2003).
Despite this distinction, the explicit goal of
reducing carbon dioxide emissions creates a link
between policies that promote renewable energy
sources and other mitigation strategies like emis-
sions trading. A TREC system might well act as a
complement to an ETS. As ETS are technologically
neutral, they do not support a specific technology
but rather provide incentives for firms to use low-
cost abatement technologies. Conversely, renew-
able energy promotion schemes directly support the
proliferation of renewable energy technologies.
Renewable energy technologies are typically high-
cost emission mitigation alternatives and ETS pro-
vides a positive albeit limited incentive to their
deployment. If the sole policy objective is carbon
dioxide emissions reductions, the coexistence of
ETS and renewable energy promotion schemes is
arguably not recommended given that renewable
energy generation is typically the more expensive
option in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emis-
sions. However, the additional socioeconomic and
environmental benefits which accrue from renew-
able energy deployment do provide a justification
for the coexistence of both instruments. In addition,
the establishment of an ETS with a green certificate
system can stimulate the generation of energy from
renewable energy sources and create a shift towards
renewable energy consumption (Gonzalez, 2007).
ETSs and renewable support schemes ultimate-
ly fulfil the same objective, namely the reduction of
greenhouse gases. However, given that both policy
instruments are directed at the same market seg-
ments, their interaction could lead to synergies as
well as conflicts. Abrell and Weight (2008) quantita-
tively assess the interaction between an ETS and a
tradable green certificate system using a static open
economy computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model.8 In addition to a business-as usual
approach, which replicates the 2004 German econ-
omy, three different scenarios are modelled: Firstly,
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an obligation for a 20 percent reduction in emis-
sions from the electricity sector and energy intensive
industries, secondly, the aforementioned 20 percent
reduction target and a 20 percent renewable elec-
tricity quota using tradable green certificates and,
thirdly, the aforementioned 20 percent reduction
target and a 20 percent renewable electricity quota
using feed-in tariffs.
In the first scenario of a 20 percent reduction in
emissions, the carbon permit price is 3.43 /t CO2.
The electricity price increases by two percent amid
an increase in the cost of generation: compared to
a BAU approach (no regulation), emission regula-
tion ultimately increases the marginal cost of fossil
fuel based generation which results in higher elec-
tricity prices. In response to the higher electricity
price, electricity demand and supply decreases by
one percent and 1.6 percent, respectively. Both sce-
narios, in which a renewable electricity quota is
imposed, are roughly identical. In both scenarios,
the carbon permit price is reduced to zero, electrici-
ty prices rise by one percent, electricity demand falls
by 0.72 percent and electricity supply falls by
roughly one percent. Both renewable policies lead
to a marginally higher welfare loss than the pure
emission reduction scenario as ‘electricity producers
deviate from their cost minimizing generation port-
folio’ (Abrell and Weigt, 2008: 11). There is a wel-
fare loss of 0.0019 percent in the first scenario, as
compared to 0.0209 percent and 0.0213 percent in
the second and third renewable energy scenarios,
respectively. 
Important conclusions can be drawn from this
analysis. Firstly, renewable energy support instru-
ments lead to a decrease in carbon prices (and ulti-
mately in the electricity price) as the increased share
of renewable energy decreases the demand for car-
bon permits. The extreme result of a zero carbon
permit price, as described, occurred because the
renewable electricity quota led to an excess supply
of carbon permits. The significant implication for
policy design is that carbon regulation becomes
unnecessary if renewable electricity targets are set
too high (Abrell and Weigt, 2008).
In addition, the imposition of a renewable elec-
tricity quota in addition to an emission trading
scheme results in additional welfare losses to soci-
ety. As such, the additional renewable electricity
support instrument must be justified. The authors
cite the learning effects associated with renewable
energy technologies as the standard justification
(Abrell and Weigt, 2008).
Notes
1. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted on 11
December 1997 and entered into force in
February 2005 (UNFCCC, 1997).
2. CO2, CH4, N20, PFCs, HFCs and SF6 (CAIT,
2009).
3. ‘Renewable electricity’ is used in this paper as a
short-hand for electricity generated from renew-
able energy sources. Electricity is an energy car-
rier, and not renewable or non-renewable in
itself; it depends on the energy sources that is
used to generate electricity.
4. The following hypothetical example illustrates
the dynamic of a quota obligation system:
Assume the electricity market consistent of gen-
erators, suppliers and customers. Generators sell
their electricity to suppliers who in turn sell it to
customers. Assume that 6 percent of supplied
electricity must be renewable. In this example,
all electricity suppliers must prove to the author-
ities that they have met this obligation by pro-
ducing TRECs at year-end – one certificate for
each MegaWatt hour (MWh) of electricity sold. A
supplier who sold 1 000 000 MWh of electrici-
ty during the specified period would have a
renewable obligation of 60  000 MWh. If the
supplier fails to meet this obligation, he or she
will likely have to pay a fine for every MWh sold
that was not renewable. If the supplier failed to
supply any renewable electricity and the fine
was R100, he would be fined R6 million. It thus
becomes very expensive not to comply with the
renewable energy target. (REF, 2008).
5. This system depends on the consumers’ willing-
ness to pay (WTP) for renewable electricity. The
WTP differs from country to country and is influ-
enced by factors such as environmental aware-
ness (Linden et al., 2005).
6. It is important to note that RPS designs vary
substantially across states.
7. This approach can be problematic when the
TREC system is implemented internationally. In
this case the TREC price is determined at the
international level while the additional technolo-
gy specific support is set at the national level. As
such, countries that provide less additional sup-
port benefit from the international TREC price
(Ragwitz et al., 2006).
8. ‘The model is based on the German input-out-
put table of the year 2004… which identifies 71
industries and commodities. Furthermore, the
German statistical office provides energy flows
and emissions of the German economy… which
are used to construct physical energy flows cor-
responding to value flows of the input-output
table and carbon emissions’ (Abrell and Weigt:
8).
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